The Vandals as a Naval Power

Later Roman  Liburnian type galley

Geiseric (428–477) was certainly the most important of the Vandal kings, and indeed was among the most influential figures of the fifth century Mediterranean world. It was under his watch that the Vandals crossed into Africa, and secured the two imperial treaties of settlement in 435 and 442. He established the position of the Vandals as a major naval power by commandeering the Carthaginian merchant marine, and was able to spread Vandal authority into Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and the Balearic Islands.

Fall of Carthage to the Vandals aggrieved the western and eastern empire, as there was a large number of galleys and a great shipyards in Carthage, creating the Vandal fleet as the equal to the joint navy of the two empires. That the empire ever allowed for so many galleys to be left in Carthage's port while the Vandals were so close by, must be one of the most monumental blunders of its history. For the first time in nearly 6 centuries, Carthage became the greatest danger to Rome since the Punic Wars.

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AD 468 witnessed the most ambitious campaign ever launched against the Vandal state in Africa, which deserves admiration for its logistical brilliance, if not its eventual result. A massive naval operation, under the command of the emperor’s brother-in-law Basiliscus, lay at the heart of this offensive, which was intended to strike directly at the Vandal capital. The statistics for this campaign given by sixth- and seventh-century historians are clearly grotesquely exaggerated, but even if we can reject Theophanes’ assertion that the fleet numbered 100,000 ships or even John the Lydian’s more modest (but still unlikely) figure of 10,000 ships, it is clear that the logistical operation was massive. Marcian ordered the extensive requisition of merchant shipping in eastern ports, including considerable numbers of Carthaginian vessels. Simultaneously, western troops were mustered under Anthemius or Ricimer, and Sicily was again taken by Marcellinus and his barbarian federates.

The mobilization of this campaign startled the inhabitants of Carthage into action. The Suevic and Gothic envoys in the city fled, and Geiseric rapidly deployed his own legates in an attempt to make peace. Quite what happened next is unclear, but Geiseric’s overtures apparently had some effect. In the early stages of the campaign, the imperial forces enjoyed some success, and may even have defeated Vandal ships sent out to intercept them. Crucially, however, Basiliscus delayed the crucial landing operations and kept his ships anchored at Mercurium off the African coast for five days. Various explanations for this delay circulated among later historians. Some suggested that Basiliscus had simply been bought off by Geiseric, others that Aspar had promised him the eastern throne if he agreed to sacrifice his fleet to the Vandal allies of the magister militum. Whatever the cause, the delay proved to be fatal. After a long stand-off, a shift in the wind allowed Geiseric to launch a fire-ship raid on the becalmed fleet. The effects were devastating. Basiliscus’ vast armada was scattered and the opportunity for a crippling blow at Carthage was lost.

As Basiliscus led his fleet towards the cataclysm of Mercurium, and Marcellinus occupied Sicily, a third front was opened up on the southern frontier of the Vandal kingdom. Drawing his army from the Byzantine troops and federates of Egypt, Heracleius led an expedition by sea against the Vandal coastal stronghold of Tripolis. Heracleius occupied the city, and then followed an overland route towards Byzacena, with the intention of uniting with Basiliscus in the Proconsular province. This expedition would have represented a considerable threat to the Vandal kingdom, but it seems to have been halted by news of Basiliscus’ defeat. Apparently demoralized, Heracleius led his army back to the relative safety of Tripolis. Tripolis remained in Byzantine hands until 470 when military pressures on the Balkan frontier, and political infighting at court, required that the troops in Africa be withdrawn. A formal peace treaty was probably signed in the same year.

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VIKING RAIDS

VIKINGS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN 844, 859-62 AND 912-13

The Mediterranean offered rich hunting grounds for the Vikings. While the Arabic states of North Africa were able to repel the raiders) France and Italy suffered badly. In the east the Vikings reached the Black Sea via the Dnepr, which allowed them to raid the riches of the Byzantine Empire and Persia.

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No one knows the reason for the Viking raids on the coastal areas of western Europe. They certainly took advantage of political instability and division in France, Britain and Ireland but such divisions were not new and in some ways the areas were stronger and better governed than they had been fifty or a hundred years previously.  Explanations based on theories of over-population in the Viking lands again raise the question of why it became crucial at this particular time. It is possible too that developments in shipbuilding meant that longer-distance raids were possible for the first time; but if such improvements did take place, we have no idea what they were, for the classic Viking ships seem to be clearly derived from those of the pre-Viking age. The explanation may rather be that a small number of adventurers set out, were lucky and returned with enough booty to persuade others to follow their example, so that the whole process gathered momentum.

The first raids were small-scale and were conducted by groups of robbers and pirates without any central control. They were directed against coastal areas and up rivers by fleets of no more than ten or twelve ships and perhaps four or five hundred men. They did not attempt to occupy the land nor did they attempt to over-winter there.

The best evidence for the beginning of the raids comes from England where the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle gives us the fullest information. In about 789 three ships from Norway raided Portland on the Dorset coast and killed the local reeve. This seems to have been an isolated incident until 793 when Vikings raided and sacked the great monastery of Lindisfarne on the Northumbrian coast. The pillage of this great holy place made a profound impression for until then monasteries had usually been respected during periods of warfare. These people were clearly heathen barbarians. In 795 the first Viking raids on Ireland began and in 799 western France was hit for the first time. In these early years the Vikings did not have things all their own way.  There was vigorous resistance on both sides of the Channel and both Charlemagne and the English kings erected fortifications to protect the coastline.

The division of the Carolingian Empire after 840, and the rivalries between the various princes, made France a much more attractive place to raid· than England, where the local rulers continued to resist effectively. The problems had begun shortly beforehand when Dorestad, the main Frankish port on the lower Rhine, was sacked no less than three times between 834 and 837. In 843 a group of Vikings seized the island of Noirmoutier on the Atlantic coast of France, driving out the monks who had previously occupied it, and setting up a permanent base for further raids. By 858 they had established another base on the island of Oissel (in the Seine just upstream from Rouen) and the king, Charles the Bald, was unable to dislodge them because of an attack by his brother Lothar from the east.

The establishment of the base at Noirmoutier clearly fired the ambitions of the most adventurous Vikings. The very next year, 844, a fleet of about one hundred ships set off to the south. Their purpose seems less the fulfilment of a master plan; more, simply to discover what pickings could be had. The inhabitants of the north coast of Spain resisted fiercely, so they moved on to sack Lisbon and Cadiz before sailing up the Guadalquivir River to Seville. Here they met their match, for the Arab rulers of Spain had an efficient army and summoned help from all over their dominions. The Vikings were severely defeated and forced to flee back to the Loire.

In 859 one of the most spectacular of all raids began. Hastein and Bjorn Ironsides led sixty-two ships south. They were driven off from the west coast of Spain but sailed through the Straits of Gibraltar; finding less formidable defences they raided the east coast of Spain and the Balearic islands. Over the winter of 859-60 they established themselves in the Camargue and raided France up the Rhone valley. Sailing east in the spring they destroyed the city of Luna in northern Italy (which they thought was Rome) and Pisa and Fiesole just outside Florence. In 861 they returned, again being driven off by the Spanish Muslims but sacking the Basque capital at Pamplona on the way home. Only twenty of the original ships returned. The expedition was the boldest and most far-reaching Viking foray into the Mediterranean but it was no campaign of conquest. The Vikings were raiders and booty collectors who relied on speed and surprise to achieve their ends. Faced by real resistance, they soon left to look for softer targets.

During the 860s France offered a less easy prey. Charles the Bald employed a mixture of military force and the payment of Danegeld (massive amounts of silver) to keep the Vikings at bay: In the Loire area, the local counts destroyed the Viking bases and drove them out; and in 866 the Vikings, loaded with bribes, left the Seine.

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Navigation must have been based on long experience of watching the weather and the stars. The Vikings had no magnetic compass but latitude could be estimated from the positions of the stars and the existence of land could be deduced from the presence of birds or cloud formations, even if the land itself could not be seen. Even so, navigation on longer voyages across the open sea must have been very perilous. In contrast, sailing down the west coast of France and Spain, as they did in the great voyages of 843-60 and again in 966-71, must have been comparatively easy, if only from a navigational point of view.

We do not have many first-hand descriptions of naval warfare, in the sense of battles between fleets. When fleets did meet, the tactics seem to have been very conservative for such brilliant seamen. The ships were roped together to make a fighting platform and the two lines of battle met head-on. As they approached each other, showers of stones and arrows would be discharged. When the fleets finally clashed, the fighting would be hand-to-hand, like a land battle in the bows of the vessels, until one side proved victorious and started to take possession of the other's ships.

War of Chioggia, (1378–1381)

PRINCIPAL COMBATANTS: Venice vs. Genoa (in alliance with Hungary and Padua)

PRINCIPAL THEATER(S): Chioggia

DECLARATION: None

MAJOR ISSUES AND OBJECTIVES: Venice’s trade rivals, especially arch enemy Genoa, wished to temper the city’s aggression and diminish its influence while aggrandizing their own.

OUTCOME: Venice endured as a great maritime trading power.

APPROXIMATE MAXIMUM NUMBER OF MEN UNDER ARMS: Unknown

CASUALTIES: Unknown

TREATIES: Peace of Turin, 1381

Venice and Genoa were ruthless and determined rivals in trade, having fought the VENETIAN-GENOESE WAR (1350–1355) over trade issues and now renewing the conflict in the War of Chioggia. The Genoese mustered a formidable roster of allies. The king of Hungary, who had already won control of Dalmatia from Venice, agreed to shelter and support the Genoese fleet. In 1379 Hungarian troops also presented a threat to Venice by land from the north. Padua was another ally. Its army severed Venice’s communications to the west. Beset by Hungary and Padua in addition to Genoa, the ever-aggressive Venetians had made the mistake of sending one of their large fleets to raid and prey upon Genoese shipping and ports in the eastern Mediterranean. This left Venice with a significantly weakened fleet for home defense—a fact that did not go unnoticed. In the summer of 1379, the Genoese fleet made a surprise appearance and moved quickly to blockade the entrances to the Venetian lagoon. By mid- August the Genoese forces had been joined by those of Hungary and Padua, so that Venice was encircled.

Now the Genoese fleet attacked swiftly at the south end of the lagoon, bringing its fleet into the channels of the lagoon, then with its allies attacking Chioggia, which soon fell. From here the capture and destruction of Venice seemed an inevitable next step. However, on December 22, 1379, the Venetians launched a diversionary attack on Chioggia, then, while the Genoese were occupied in resisting this apparent attempt to retake the settlement, they used the cover of darkness to submerge obstructions, closing off every channel the Genoese fleet could use to escape from the cul-de-sac at Chioggia. When the Venetian galley fleet, which had been on the raiding expedition in the Mediterranean, returned to Venice on January 1, 1380, it was an easy matter to encircle the trapped Genoese. Over the next several months the two sides skirmished as the Genoese attempted to clear a channel of escape. The Venetians impeded this activity by continually firing on the Genoese. Finally, in June 1380 the entire Genoese fleet, effectively held under siege and now on the verge of starvation, surrendered, and 4,000 Genoese sailors were taken prisoner.

The spectacular turn-about Venetian victory at Chioggia prompted the signing of the Peace of Turin in 1381. The treaty gained no territory from Genoa or any of its allies, but it did put an end to Genoa’s challenge against Venetian maritime superiority. If Venice did not ultimately triumph over Genoa, it at least earned the right to survive and to continue as a great Mediterranean trading power.

Further reading: John Jeffries Martin and Dennis Romano, eds., Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297–1797 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2003); John Julius Norwich, A History of Venice (New York: Knopf, 1989).