Greek Fire – Nine Little-Known Facts About The Byzantine Empire’s Most Secret Weapon

Greek Fire - Nine Little-Known Facts About The Byzantine Empire's Most Secret Weapon

As far back as the 7th Century, fighting ships of the Byzantine Empire were dousing enemy vessels with a flaming liquid known by western historians as "Greek fire".

The Vandals as a Naval Power

Later Roman  Liburnian type galley

Geiseric (428–477) was certainly the most important of the Vandal kings, and indeed was among the most influential figures of the fifth century Mediterranean world. It was under his watch that the Vandals crossed into Africa, and secured the two imperial treaties of settlement in 435 and 442. He established the position of the Vandals as a major naval power by commandeering the Carthaginian merchant marine, and was able to spread Vandal authority into Sicily, Corsica, Sardinia and the Balearic Islands.

Fall of Carthage to the Vandals aggrieved the western and eastern empire, as there was a large number of galleys and a great shipyards in Carthage, creating the Vandal fleet as the equal to the joint navy of the two empires. That the empire ever allowed for so many galleys to be left in Carthage's port while the Vandals were so close by, must be one of the most monumental blunders of its history. For the first time in nearly 6 centuries, Carthage became the greatest danger to Rome since the Punic Wars.

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AD 468 witnessed the most ambitious campaign ever launched against the Vandal state in Africa, which deserves admiration for its logistical brilliance, if not its eventual result. A massive naval operation, under the command of the emperor’s brother-in-law Basiliscus, lay at the heart of this offensive, which was intended to strike directly at the Vandal capital. The statistics for this campaign given by sixth- and seventh-century historians are clearly grotesquely exaggerated, but even if we can reject Theophanes’ assertion that the fleet numbered 100,000 ships or even John the Lydian’s more modest (but still unlikely) figure of 10,000 ships, it is clear that the logistical operation was massive. Marcian ordered the extensive requisition of merchant shipping in eastern ports, including considerable numbers of Carthaginian vessels. Simultaneously, western troops were mustered under Anthemius or Ricimer, and Sicily was again taken by Marcellinus and his barbarian federates.

The mobilization of this campaign startled the inhabitants of Carthage into action. The Suevic and Gothic envoys in the city fled, and Geiseric rapidly deployed his own legates in an attempt to make peace. Quite what happened next is unclear, but Geiseric’s overtures apparently had some effect. In the early stages of the campaign, the imperial forces enjoyed some success, and may even have defeated Vandal ships sent out to intercept them. Crucially, however, Basiliscus delayed the crucial landing operations and kept his ships anchored at Mercurium off the African coast for five days. Various explanations for this delay circulated among later historians. Some suggested that Basiliscus had simply been bought off by Geiseric, others that Aspar had promised him the eastern throne if he agreed to sacrifice his fleet to the Vandal allies of the magister militum. Whatever the cause, the delay proved to be fatal. After a long stand-off, a shift in the wind allowed Geiseric to launch a fire-ship raid on the becalmed fleet. The effects were devastating. Basiliscus’ vast armada was scattered and the opportunity for a crippling blow at Carthage was lost.

As Basiliscus led his fleet towards the cataclysm of Mercurium, and Marcellinus occupied Sicily, a third front was opened up on the southern frontier of the Vandal kingdom. Drawing his army from the Byzantine troops and federates of Egypt, Heracleius led an expedition by sea against the Vandal coastal stronghold of Tripolis. Heracleius occupied the city, and then followed an overland route towards Byzacena, with the intention of uniting with Basiliscus in the Proconsular province. This expedition would have represented a considerable threat to the Vandal kingdom, but it seems to have been halted by news of Basiliscus’ defeat. Apparently demoralized, Heracleius led his army back to the relative safety of Tripolis. Tripolis remained in Byzantine hands until 470 when military pressures on the Balkan frontier, and political infighting at court, required that the troops in Africa be withdrawn. A formal peace treaty was probably signed in the same year.

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The Mediterranean - The Balance of Seapower in the Eighteenth Century I

Naval Battle of Augusta, by Ambroise-Louis Garneray.

The French Case

In this new context the idea of the command of the Mediterranean appeared. In France, Colbert built his naval policy around this idea. In 1679 he wrote to the général des galères: ‘Considérez s’il vous plaît quelle gloire le Roy et vous recevrez d’être entièrement maitre de la Méditerranée et de n’avoir jamais aucune puissance dans cette Mer qui puisse ni égaler ni balancer celle du Roy.’ In his instructions to his son and successor Seignelay, he repeated that the minister must ‘penser continuellement aux moyens de rendre le Roy maître de la Méditerranée’. The first step of his grand dessein was first executed with the Sicily campaign, where Vivonne and Duquesne were victorious at Stromboli, Augusta and Palermo in 1676, but the tactical command of the sea obtained through these victories could not be exploited strategically. France was too heavily engaged on the northeastern front and was unable to provide enough troops to subdue Sicily. The island was finally evacuated and the campaign ended without result.

The efforts of Louis XIV, of Colbert, and of the latter’s son Seignelay to build a strong navy are well known. The results are impressive: a nearly ruined navy became, in two decades, the first in Europe. France competed more than honorably with the Anglo-Dutch coalition, particularly during the Nine Years War. In this war, however, the main strategic theater was in the English Channel, the Mediterranean had become secondary. The main French base was Brest, even if Toulon received important equipment and many more projects. Toulon was still active in the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession in 1701–14. There was only one battle-inline, Velez-Malaga in 1704, but both fleets were engaged in the support of military operations in Catalonia. In October 1707, soon after the siege of Toulon, the well-known Duguay-Trouin and Forbin surprised an English convoy at Cape Lizard and captured it almost entirely: four warships and 60 merchant vessels. This coup d’éclat, somewhat forgotten by contemporary naval historians, had a great impact on the war in Spain. It was a severe blow for the Imperial Army in Catalonia and contributed to the victory of Felipe V. The French fleet also supported the sieges of Gibraltar and Nice, but the naval effort collapsed after 1706 for several reasons. Priority was given to the Army to repel the invasion; Toulon was besieged by the allies and suffered heavy casualties in 1707, and, first of all in the longue durée, the British, having seized the splendid position of Gibraltar, constantly threatened the links between Brest and Toulon.

In the face of this France was not able to establish itself as a durable seapower in the Mediterranean. It tried periodically to compete with England, but could not impose domination at sea. In the end, the grand dessein of Louis XIV and Colbert was abandoned by their successors. The Regency accepted second rank at sea and Louis XV made no serious effort to rebuild the Navy. After the great disasters of the Seven Years War, which occurred more in the Atlantic than in the Mediterranean, Choiseul tried to reconstitute French naval power. His aim was to have a navy equivalent to two-thirds of the Royal Navy, with the hope that the Spanish and the Neapolitan Navy would provide the complement to match British superiority. His policy was validated during the American War of Independence. Finally, during the last decades of the ancien régime, France had an efficient navy that was able to match the Royal Navy. Yet France was not a naval power in relation to its military power. French maritime trade suffered heavily during the Seven Years War, but during the War of the Austrian Succession and the American War of Independence the Navy was able to organize an effective convoy system for the protection of trade.

The Mediterranean - The Balance of Seapower in the Eighteenth Century II

The Battle of Málaga (or Vélez-Málaga)

British Command of the Sea?

If eighteenth-century France was not a seapower, may we say that England was a seapower in the Mediterranean during that century? The answer seems evident. The eighteenth century was the period of English ascendancy at sea. It no longer had naval rivals; its maritime trade was flourishing and its navy was able to compete with any enemy and even deter some reluctant countries. In the Mediterranean the Royal Navy relied on the strategic base of Gibraltar, seized in 1704 (and retained after the inconclusive battle of Velez-Malaga, 24 August 1704), and, during the first part of the century, on the advanced post at Minorca which was seized in 1708. From that point onward, it maintained a permanent squadron in the Mediterranean. As Jeremy Black has noted, the British naval presence in the Mediterranean during the eighteenth century marked the beginning of naval diplomacy: ‘it led some admirals, such as Byng in the late 1710s and Mathews in the 1740s, wielding proconsular power, negotiating with foreign rulers, dictating to British diplomats’, to be able to convoy troops, to mount amphibious operations and to intimidate Naples into neutrality in 1742.

Britain was not able to do this without difficulties. During the Nine Years War England had to engage privateers in the Mediterranean (1695), which meant that it did not have sea control. The use of Gibraltar was the condition for exercising seapower in the Mediterranean, but during the wars the pressure on the Rock was so great that a good part of the Royal Navy’s capabilities had to be diverted to resupply the garrison. When the base was supposed to sustain the fleet, it was, in fact, sometimes the fleet which sustained the base. Consequently, British capabilities were weakened in effectively dominating the western Mediterranean during periods of conflict or simply in protecting British trade. After achieving success in holding Gibraltar (19 March 1705, after five French ships-of-the- line had been sunk and the siege of Gibraltar raised), the Royal Navy was unable to launch the attack against Cadiz that the French and the Spaniards had feared. Even though French trade had suffered heavily, British trade received severe blows from French privateers and also from Tourville’s fleet in the capture of the Smyrna convoy off Cape St Vincent in June 1693 (80 merchantmen seized).

For a long time British admirals were not very lucky in the Mediterranean. In 1704 the battle of Velez-Malaga was inconclusive, but would have ended in a British disaster if the Earl of Toulouse had chosen to pursue the fight, since the British ships had no more ammunition. Similarly in 1744, during the War of the Austrian Succession, the blockade of the Spanish fleet initiated by Admiral Mathew ended in failure after the battle of Cape Sicié and he was court-martialed. At the battle of Port Mahon on 20 May 1756 Admiral John Byng was unable to repel the French fleet of La Galissoniére and to prevent the fall of Minorca. He was court-martialed and shot after an unfair trial. The Royal Navy took its revenge three years later in the battle of Lagos, which saw the destruction of the French Mediterranean squadron. The result, however, was strategically ambiguous. The British were unable to recover Minorca and the shortage of naval bases would be fatal for them during the American War of Independence.

From this overview we may then conclude that the Royal Navy did hold sea control in the Mediterranean throughout the century. During this period British trade in the Mediterranean remained active and was less sensitive to the shock of wars than the French,26 thanks to an efficient system of convoys. It is this combination of commercial and naval preeminence that characterizes seapower. Seapower, however, is not synonymous with hegemony. Britain had a good instrument in its navy but it was insufficient to match a coalition of Mediterranean powers. Britain had to rely on a French alliance against Spain during the Regency, when the Spanish fleet was destroyed at the battle of Cape Passaro on 11 August 1718, while supporting operations in Sicily. It had to rely on a Spanish alliance against France during the first years of the Revolution. Later, when confronted by a coalition of Mediterranean powers, it was unable to retain strategic sea control, as shown during the American War of Independence or for some months in 1797–98. The experience of the British in the Mediterranean during the eighteenth century reminds us that seapower is not necessarily absolute and does not mean the same thing as sea supremacy.