Naval Battle of Augusta, by Ambroise-Louis Garneray.
The French Case
In this new context the idea of the command of the
Mediterranean appeared. In France, Colbert built his naval policy around this
idea. In 1679 he wrote to the général des galères: ‘Considérez s’il vous plaît
quelle gloire le Roy et vous recevrez d’être entièrement maitre de la
Méditerranée et de n’avoir jamais aucune puissance dans cette Mer qui puisse ni
égaler ni balancer celle du Roy.’ In his instructions to his son and successor
Seignelay, he repeated that the minister must ‘penser continuellement aux moyens
de rendre le Roy maître de la Méditerranée’. The first step of his grand
dessein was first executed with the Sicily campaign, where Vivonne and Duquesne
were victorious at Stromboli, Augusta and Palermo in 1676, but the tactical
command of the sea obtained through these victories could not be exploited
strategically. France was too heavily engaged on the northeastern front and was
unable to provide enough troops to subdue Sicily. The island was finally
evacuated and the campaign ended without result.
The efforts of Louis XIV, of Colbert, and of the latter’s
son Seignelay to build a strong navy are well known. The results are
impressive: a nearly ruined navy became, in two decades, the first in Europe.
France competed more than honorably with the Anglo-Dutch coalition,
particularly during the Nine Years War. In this war, however, the main
strategic theater was in the English Channel, the Mediterranean had become
secondary. The main French base was Brest, even if Toulon received important
equipment and many more projects. Toulon was still active in the first years of
the War of the Spanish Succession in 1701–14. There was only one battle-inline,
Velez-Malaga in 1704, but both fleets were engaged in the support of military
operations in Catalonia. In October 1707, soon after the siege of Toulon, the
well-known Duguay-Trouin and Forbin surprised an English convoy at Cape Lizard
and captured it almost entirely: four warships and 60 merchant vessels. This
coup d’éclat, somewhat forgotten by contemporary naval historians, had a great
impact on the war in Spain. It was a severe blow for the Imperial Army in
Catalonia and contributed to the victory of Felipe V. The French fleet also
supported the sieges of Gibraltar and Nice, but the naval effort collapsed
after 1706 for several reasons. Priority was given to the Army to repel the
invasion; Toulon was besieged by the allies and suffered heavy casualties in
1707, and, first of all in the longue durée, the British, having seized the
splendid position of Gibraltar, constantly threatened the links between Brest
and Toulon.
In the face of this France was not able to establish itself
as a durable seapower in the Mediterranean. It tried periodically to compete
with England, but could not impose domination at sea. In the end, the grand
dessein of Louis XIV and Colbert was abandoned by their successors. The Regency
accepted second rank at sea and Louis XV made no serious effort to rebuild the
Navy. After the great disasters of the Seven Years War, which occurred more in the
Atlantic than in the Mediterranean, Choiseul tried to reconstitute French naval
power. His aim was to have a navy equivalent to two-thirds of the Royal Navy,
with the hope that the Spanish and the Neapolitan Navy would provide the
complement to match British superiority. His policy was validated during the
American War of Independence. Finally, during the last decades of the ancien
régime, France had an efficient navy that was able to match the Royal Navy. Yet
France was not a naval power in relation to its military power. French maritime
trade suffered heavily during the Seven Years War, but during the War of the
Austrian Succession and the American War of Independence the Navy was able to
organize an effective convoy system for the protection of trade.
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